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Poison pills are controversial devices. There is no common conclusion how the market reacts 
to their adoption. This empirical study finds statistically significant, positive abnormal returns 
centred on the day of the adoption of the pill. Consequently, this paper argues in favour of the 
shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis, stating that poison pills protect shareholders by 
giving the management a superior bargaining position. Further sub-sample analysis shows 
that poison pill adoption with an unwelcomed takeover threat drive the positive results in the 
sample. Routine poison pills do not show clear positive abnormal returns at the date of the pill 
adoption. This conclusion coincides with similar results found by Schepker, Oh and Patel 
(2016). 
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Martin Lipton invented the poison pill in 1982 (Sunder, 2014). Poison pills provide special 
rights to shareholders. These rights, sometimes referred as “shareholder rights plan”, make it 
difficult for other parties to obtain control over the firm. The pill “poisons” any possible 
acquirer as the takeover gets disproportionally expensive (Anand, 2015). In the United States, 
poison pills can be implemented by the management without shareholder approval. Therefore 
a clear understanding of the shareholders’ reaction to poison pill adoption is necessary in 
order to evaluate its impact properly (Johnson & Meade, 2011).  
Literature names two opposing hypotheses concerning the market reaction to poison pill 
adoption. On the one hand, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis states that poison pills 
isolate the management from the positive forces of the corporate control market. A constant 
threat of takeover is supposed to be a natural mechanism to reduce agency costs (Kang, 2013). 
Poison pills protect the management from this external influence and consequently deteriorate 
the principal agent conflict. The management can act according to personal benefits and 
interests. As a consequence, they choose inappropriate strategies that do not maximize the 
wealth of shareholders (Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, & Mahoney, 1997).  
On the other hand, the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis defines antitakeover 
provisions as rational devices that do protect shareholders. According to the hypothesis, the 
power of rejecting undesirable raiders is in the long-term interest of shareholders (Yeh, 2014). 
In general, the long-term perspective of a company should be preferred instead of short-term 
profits. The shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis is supported by two independent 
arguments. Firstly, poison pills establish a superior bargaining position. Secondly, these 
devices enable management to extract the maximum bid premium (Datta & Iskandar-Datta, 
1996). 




Concerning these hypotheses, the empirical findings show controversial results. Early 
literature mostly supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Ryngaert, 1988). Recent 
research tends to argue in favour of the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis 
(Schepker et al., 2016). The latter conclusion is in line with the findings of this paper. 
The underlying empirical research relies on event study methodology with secondary data of 
4,479 poison pill adoption dates between 1997 and 2016. Positive abnormal returns 
throughout the sample indicate strong evidence in favour of the shareholder wealth 
maximization hypothesis. These findings are robust for three versions of the market model 
with diverse benchmarks as well as the Carhart four-factor model. The three index variations 
used in the market model are the S&P 500, the CRSP database value weighted and the CRSP 
database with equally weighted returns. A three day event window (-1; 1) centred on the pill 
adoption date lead to a cumulative abnormal return of 3.97% compared to the S&P 500. All 
three variations of the market model indicate similar results. The findings for the Carhart four-
factor model are slightly lower as the additional factors provide higher explanatory power to 
determine the origin of the abnormal return (Carhart, 1997).  
Sub-sample analysis shows consistency of the findings through various time periods. Further 
analysis indicates that poison pill adoption with an unwelcomed takeover threat drive the 
positive results in the sample. As the category “friendly deal” shows extraordinary high 
abnormal returns, shareholders do not automatically value the isolation of the corporate 
control market. Instead, shareholders seem to value the protection against hostile offers or 
unwelcomed bids after a friendly deal was placed. Contrary, routine poison pills do not show 
clear positive abnormal returns at the date of the pill adoption. These conclusions coincide 
with similar recent literature (Schepker et al., 2016).  




In the next section of the paper, the theoretical context is defined and the two hypotheses are 
specified. Afterwards, existing literature is reviewed. Subsequently, the data sample, 
methodology and the resulting empirical outcomes will be presented to end in a conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Context 
2.1 Anti-takeover Provisions 
The market of mergers and acquisitions is constantly growing. In a friendly takeover, the 
management and the board of directors approve the transaction and its buyout terms. In this 
scenario, the shareholders usually vote for the acceptance of the takeover offer as well. In 
contrast, a hostile takeover attempts to address the firm‘s shareholder directly and tries to 
replace the management. The latter can install legal devices in order to prevent such a hostile 
takeover attempt. These devices are also known as “anti-takeover provisions” or “takeover 
defences”. A common risk of anti-takeover provisions is that management entrenches itself 
instead of acting in the full interest of the shareholders. 
Certainly, these definitions describe a vast spectrum of different devices. An important 
distinction for antitakeover provisions is whether the adoption of the device needs shareholder 
ratification or not. Poison pills can be implemented without shareholders’ approval in the 
United States. However, this decision depends on the legalisation of each state individually. 
Poison pills without shareholder approval are, for instance, legally prohibited in Europe 
(Johnson & Meade, 2011). 
2.2 Poison pills 
Poison pills provide special rights to the shareholders. These rights, sometimes referred as 
shareholder rights plans, make it difficult for other parties to obtain control over the firm and 
thereby protecting the firm from hostile and unwelcomed bids (Anand, 2015). Consequently, 
this triggered device “poisons” any possible acquirer as the takeover gets disproportionally 




expensive. According to Literature, poison pills are described as the most powerful device in 
preventing takeovers, some sources go even further and call poison pills the “Holy Grail” of 
antitakeover defences (Velasco, 2003). 
In general, poison pills are adopted as a routine device to prevent future hostile takeovers. 
Specific purpose pills are implemented as a response to a certain event. In this case, the time 
period is restricted to the relevance of the event, while traditional pills have a pre-defined, 
long-term horizon (Schepker et al., 2016). There are five major versions of poison pills: 
preferred stock plans, flip-over right plans, ownership flip-in plans, back-end plans and voting 
plans (Dowen, Johnson, & Jensen, 1994). The following chapters will elaborate on these five 
types in detail. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The existing literature concerning antitakeover provision adoption is mainly divided into two 
opposing hypotheses: the “shareholder maximization” hypothesis and the “managerial 
entrenchment” hypothesis, which will now be discussed. 
2.3.1 Managerial entrenchment 
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis defines poison pills as harmful devices, as they 
isolate the management from the external forces of the corporate control market (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). Takeovers are seen as a positive governance mechanism which 
reduces managerial entrenchment and increases the efficiency of the management. A poison 
pill in place deteriorates the chance of a takeover and consequently declines the probability 
that a low skilled manager gets replaced or less compensated. Consequently, companies with 
shareholder right plans are considered as inefficient (Bhojraj, Sengupta, & Zhang, 2014). 
Empirical evidence proves that CEOs of companies, which adopt antitakeover defences 
usually have a higher salary than firms without takeover protection (Schepker & Oh, 2012). 
and other evidence suggests that managers maintain their position at the cost of shareholder 




wealth (Yeh, 2014). Entrenching managers might also alter the firm´s core operating business 
to their personal abilities and interests, instead of maximizing shareholder wealth. 
Consequently, the managers get more important and less replaceable to the firm (Burkart & 
Panunzi, 2006). 
The hypothesis points out that poison pills deteriorate the principal agent problem with the 
management. A hostile takeover attempt from the bidder might be welcomed by the majority 
of the shareholders. However, due to the antitakeover devices in place, the hostile bidder has 
minimal chances to win the takeover encounter against the management successfully (Kang, 
2013). It is, on these grounds that poison pills create a gap between the bidder and the 
shareholders as they exclusively put the board in charge of takeover proceedings (Anand, 
2015). 
Poison pills harm diverse types of shareholders. In general, shareholders suffer as poison pills 
shrink the chances of a profitable acquisition. Additionally, transaction expenses shrink the 
liquidation value and small shareholders do not have a significant chance to monitor the board 
for their entrenchment. Main shareholders like institutional investors that hold a significant 
amount of ownership, are limited in transactions between each other, as the poison pill gets 
triggered at a certain threshold (Schepker & Oh, 2012).  
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) define a Governance Index (G-Index) that measures 
shareholder rights in a specific firm. Based on this methodology, Bebchuk investigates an 
Entrenchment Index (E-index), which consists of six major antitakeover provisions. Each of 
the six antitakeover defences in place increase the entrenchment level of the firm by one 
score. The corresponding empirical outcome states that an enhancement in the index level 
results in a decline in firm´s value (measured by Tobin´s Q) as well as negative abnormal 
returns. Poison pills in place are seen as a harmful device for shareholder wealth (Bebchuk et 
al., 2009). 




In conclusion, these studies support the hypothesis that the management acts according to its 
personal benefits and interests. They choose inappropriate strategies that do not maximize the 
wealth of the shareholders (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997).  
2.3.2 Shareholders wealth maximization 
The “shareholder wealth hypothesis”, “long-term value creation” or “converge of interest 
hypothesis” implies that antitakeover provisions are beneficial for shareholders. This 
hypothesis is divided into two main arguments. The first argument justifies the long-term 
value creation of poison pills through effective takeover deterrence.  
As the board is in control of the firm´s takeover decisions, it has the power to reject 
undesirable raiders, which displays the long-term interests of the shareholders (Yeh, 2014). 
Diverse shareholders fear losses in payoffs when rejecting the initial bid of the potential 
acquirer. Consequently, a hostile bidder might trigger emotional and irrational behaviour, 
especially when shareholders are unorganised. Therefore, the board can be named as the most 
skilled party to decide upon a possible takeover (Kang, 2013). Additionally, antitakeover 
provisions in place do allow that the management can focus on the long-term profit 
perspective of a company instead of short-term earnings. The present board might have 
superior information about the current value of the firm, as well as its future developments 
(Burkart & Panunzi, 2006). It is also vital to state that an adopted poison pill functions as an 
enhancement in the corporate governance system as it offers the firm flexibility for operating, 
apart from the raw conditions of the corporate control market (Dowen et al., 1994). The 
disadvantage of imperfect informed shareholders is that they do not value the stock 
appropriately and therefore risk the takeover at an unfavourable price (Stein, 1988). 
Danielson and Karpoff (2002) support the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis with 
evidence that poison pills improve performance and company value. In their data sample of 
463 S&P 500 firms, they find that the operating performance is significantly improving 




during the following five years after poison pill adoption. Moreover, this enhancement in 
performance is positively correlated to investor’s stock reaction when adopting the pill 
(Danielson & Karpoff, 2002). 
Another paper by Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2013) directly analyses the empirical 
contribution of IPO firms to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Firstly, they find that 
companies with antitakeover provisions in place have higher quality managers. Secondly, the 
firms with highly skilled management and a larger number of antitakeover devices outperform 
the remaining firms. Consequently, the evidence rejects the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis and argues in favour of long-term value creations thorough the adoption of 
takeover defences (Gordon & Pound, 1993). 
Chemmanur and Tian (2013) establish a link between antitakeover defences and corporate 
innovation, which is a key factor for a long-term competitive advantage. Therefore, the 
“innovation channel” is an essential determinant of firm value. The findings suggest that firms 
with antitakeover provisions in place are more innovative and therefore increase firm´s value. 
These outcomes are interpreted in favour of the long-term value creating hypothesis as 
antitakeover provisions stimulate innovation. Consequently, antitakeover provisions can be 
seen as an enhancement of long-term value creation by protecting the management from 
short-term pressures from the equity market. This reduced level of uncertainty is significantly 
valued in the innovation channel (Chemmanur & Tian, 2013). 
The second argument defines the protection against too low prices in takeovers as value driver 
for the empirical results. According to this argumentation, the major advantage is not a long-
term deterrence effect but the increased bargaining power.  
Without the adoption of an antitakeover device, an acquirer would be given the possibility to 
use the agency problem that occurs between shareholders and the management. As a result the 
paid price could be less than the true market value of the firm (Anand, 2015). According to 




the long-term value creating hypothesis, antitakeover defences increase the quality of work of 
the management, embolden firm in investing in human capital, give the board a better base for 
negotiations and raise competition among bidders (Burkart & Panunzi, 2006).  
Comment and Schwert (1995) find the cost of deterrence set too high and that the advantages 
of the bargaining position are underestimated in the literature that supports the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. Poison pills change the bargaining position as they increase the gain 
to the target firm and raise the costs to the bidder. Consequently, poison pills are related to 
higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, in case of a successful takeover as well as 
the event without transaction (Comment & Schwert, 1995). 
Holmén, Nivorozhkin and Rana (2012) use Heckman selection models to account for the 
likelihood of being a takeover target, the extent of the takeover premium and antitakeover 
provisions. Ordinary least square regressions show higher takeover premiums for transactions 
with antitakeover defences is place (Holmén, Nivorozhkin, & Rana, 2012). 
 
3 Review of Empirical Studies on Poison Pill Adoption 
3.1 Managerial entrenchment  
In line with similar studies from the late 80s, Malesta and Walking (1988) analyse the 
shareholders´ reaction to poison pill adoption and the industry characteristics of the adopting 
firm. Their sample of 118 poison pill adoptions indicates a decline in stock price and 
consequently supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. They also find that firms that 
adopt a poison pill have a higher probability of being taken over than the non-adopting 
counterparties (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988). 
At a similar point of time, Ryngaert (1988) analysed a sample of 380 adoptions between 1982 
and 1986. All in all, the market reaction for the full sample is negative with an average 




abnormal return of –0.03%. Additionally, he differentiates between the variations of poison 
pills. Only the most preventive variations do entrench management (Ryngaert, 1988). 
Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) examine wealth effects of antitakeover provisions on 
shareholders as well as bondholders. Their results for stock market reaction remain 
insignificant. However, the outcome of statistically significant bondholder losses is consistent 
with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. In the case of a takeover, corporate bondholder 
are more sensitive to losses than shareholders as they have fewer rights. Firms that adopt 
poison pills also underperform their industry peers when it comes to key performance figures. 
The outcomes suggest that the pill adoption is stimulated by poorly skilled managers, trying to 
isolate themselves from the transaction in the corporate control market (Datta & Iskandar-
Datta, 1996). 
Sundaramurthy (1997) finds a negative market reaction in his data sample of 486 adoptions 
between 1984 and 1988. He argues that the extent of the reaction is dependent on the board 
structure of a firm. The board of a company is responsible for maximizing shareholder´s 
value, taking important decisions and employ key workers (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). The 
separation of the CEO and the chairman position increases transparency and reduces agency 
costs. Consequently, this segmentation shrinks the negative market reaction as well. However, 
the negative market reaction increases if the firm´s board has outsider-dominated persons in 
authority. 
Sikes, Tian and Wilson (2014) also find a significant negative market reaction to poison pill 
adoption, supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Moreover, this empirical study 
studies the effect of 62 poison pill announcements due to net operating losses (NOL pills). 
These pills are adopted to protect tax losses, which would disappear in case of altering 
ownership. Empirical research finds an increased negative market reaction for NOL pills. The 




management‘s purpose does not appear credible to the shareholders and therefore increases 
the agency costs (Sikes, Tian, & Wilson, 2014). 
Yeh (2014) analysed the market reaction of the adoption of anti-takeover defences for 130 
Japanese firms between 2005 and 2007. The paper underlines the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis by detecting statistically significant negative abnormal returns for various time 
periods (Yeh, 2014). 
3.2 Shareholder wealth maximization 
Goh and Caton (2008) evolve the hypothesis that the market reaction of poison pill adoption 
depends on the governance structure of the firm ex ante. In line with Bebchuk et al (2009), 
they distinguish between “democratic” firms without antitakeover provisions in place and 
“autocratically” firms when takeover defences are present. Companies that were classified 
“democratic” isolate management from efficient market conditions as firms can be 
significantly undervalued. In this case, the adoption of a pill supports the management and 
helps to focus on long-term benefits instead of short-term pressure. That reduces the principal 
agent conflict. As a consequence, the most democratic governed companies show significant 
positive abnormal returns as well as positive long-term earnings growth forecasts for poison 
pill adoption (Goh & Caton, 2008). 
Most recently, Schepker, Oh and Patel (2016) find poison pills as devices which send 
“equivocal signals”. They stress that firm and bidder have contrary interests and the 
interpretation is essential. Therefore, they control for differences of poison pills adopted to 
protect net operation losses (NOL poison pills) as well as adopted pills if the firm receives an 
acquisition threat. The empirical results state positive investor reaction when the poison pill is 
in place to fight a takeover offer. However, NOL poison pills cause a negative market 
reaction. Because of the fact that poison pills are mostly used for defence purposes, this 




evidence is interpreted as support for the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis 
(Schepker et al., 2016). 
In their series of “Framing controversial actions”, Rhee and Fiss (2014) provide an additional 
event study methodology and content analysis to evaluate market reaction of poison pill 
adoptions from 1983 to 2008. The authors argue that the market reaction depends on the 
contextual attributes. On the one hand, poison pill adoptions with an “institutional logic” as a 
base lead to positive abnormal returns. On the other hand, statements that contain managers 
with a possible selfish interest show a significant negative market reaction and should not be 
forgotten. (Rhee & Fiss, 2014). 
Heron and Lie (2015) investigate legal validations of poison pills by the Delaware Supreme 
court. After the Moran v. Household decision in 1985, two important validations were 
adjudicated in the “1995 Delaware rulings”. Previous literature describes these rulings as an 
exogenous shock for managerial entrenchment. This assumption is denied by Heron and Lie 
in their paper. They do not find evidence that the “1995 Delaware rulings” increased 
managerial entrenchment. In fact, further analysis implies that poison pills in general do not 
entrench management. Instead, based on a sample of takeovers from 1985 to 2009, poison 
pills enhance the takeover premiums for shareholders (Heron & Lie, 2015). 
In line with Comment and Schwert (1995), antitakeover provisions enhance the bargaining 
position of the firm in a possible takeover. As a result, shareholders wealth enhances with 
better premiums (Bodnaruk, Gao, Östberg, & Yun, 2011). 
Heron and Lie (2006) search evidence for the market reaction of poison pills by analysing 526 
hostile takeover attempts. They state that poison pills are in the best interest of shareholders. 
This hypothesis is valid for “routine pills” as well as “morning after pills” that were 
implemented as a consequence of a takeover attempt. Poison pills increase the bargaining 
position of a company and therefore enhance the takeover premium. Heron and Lie worry 




about the new shareholder activism trend to repeal poison pills. They also criticise academics 
like Gompers, Ishii and and Metrick (2003) that punish firms for antitakeover provisions in 
their governance indexes (Heron & Lie, 2006). 
Forjan and Ness (2003) also argue in favour of poison pill adoption and the resulting effect of 
positive abnormal returns as well as increased bargaining power. Furthermore, they find a 
relation of capital structure and the perceived strength of poison pills. Abnormal returns on 
the announcement date and the firm-debt asset ratio of a firm are significantly positively 
correlated. As a result, highly leveraged firms are described to witness more bargaining power 
in the event of a takeover bid (Forjan & Ness, 2003).  
3.3 Contribution to existing literature and business world 
It is of great interest to understand the facts which have been mentioned in the previous 
chapters. Having read so far, it can be claimed that there are no common conclusions to the 
market reaction and poison pill adoption does not call for a single outcome. Poison pills are 
indeed one of the most controversial antitakeover provisions discussed in empirical literature 
(Sunder, 2014). Evidence is also mixed due to the fact that research is generated from four 
different academic disciplines: economics, finance, management and law (Straska & Waller, 
2014). Depending on the purpose and the circumstances, some firms might profit from poison 
pill adoption while others will not. 
Moreover, a large amount of relevant literature was written in the 1980s, especially after the 
Moran v. Household officially validated the use of poison pills in 1985. However, due to on-
going legal decisions within the prior decades, research before the 1990s does not seem really 
useful for the current antitakeover provisions environment (Sokolyk, 2010). Empirical 
analyses show that the negative market reaction to poison pills during the mergers and 
acquisition wave in the 1980s vary significantly from other periods in time and therefore 
should be interpreted with caution (Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). 




In addition to that, new trends in the socio-economic environment have to be taken into 
account and kept in mind when analysing earlier research. In recent years, shareholder 
activists appeared as an important stakeholder. They influence and speak out to significant 
decisions as poison pill adoption (Sikes et al., 2014). 
The reasons stated above justify the motivation for this empirical research paper. Additional 
studies that contribute to the controversial topic are still in need, urgently. Furthermore, the 
sample period used in this study is more extensive comparable to other recent studies, like 
Rhee and Fiss (2014) or Schepker et al. (2016). Moreover, this paper conducts various sub 
sample analyses in order to draw more specific conclusions about the origin of the abnormal 
returns. 
 
4 Data Sample 
Poison pill adoption dates were retrieved from the “Corporate Governance Market Overview” 
in Eikon, the financial software product by Thomson Reuters. In fact, 4,479 poison pill 
adoption events by American companies are collected. Hence, the study mainly draws on 
secondary data for the analysis. This study focuses on American firms due to legal constrains. 
Poison pills are prohibited in the United Kingdom and can only be placed with explicit 
shareholder approval in the European Union. Conversely, legislation in the United States 
officially allows the usage of antitakeover takeover protections upon condition that they are 
used proportionally. In order to fully use the Eventus software for abnormal return 
calculations, further financial information was added through a Bloomberg Terminal from 
Bloomberg L.P. 
The poison pill adoption dates range from 1
st
 January 1997 to 22
th 
December 2015. Adoption 
dates prior to 1997 are not used as the data sample of poison pill adoption in the United States 
has already been conducted in various previous literature. The earliest years in the data 




sample (1998, 1999 and 1997) are the years with the highest share while the most recent years 
(2014, 2015 and 2013) have the least stake. Generally, there seems to be a declining trend of 
poison pill adoption throughout the period. Interestingly, an exception of this pattern can be 
seen in the years of 2008 and 2009, when the financial crisis in the U.S. was at its peak. 
Possibly, uncertainty in the economic environment and the financial instability of the 
companies lead to an increased demand on antitakeover protection. In order to control more 
for time-wise differences, this study divides the data sample into sub-periods and presents the 
results separately as well. As the sub-period of the three latest years of the prior century 
(1997, 1998 and 1999) with 1,396 adoption dates already takes 31.17% of the sample size, 
this sub-period is limited to duration of three years. Further sub-samples (from 2000 to 2004 
and from 2005 to 2009) range over five years with respective shares of 30.97% and 21.34%. 
Finally, the most recent sub-sample consists of 740 adoptions from 2010 to 2015.  
Most of the data retrieved (98.75%), states a triggering reason why the poison pill is adopted. 
However, the majority of events (68.41%) are to refresh the routine measure that the firm 
stays protected. A smaller share (18.04%) is adopted due to friendly deals. In this scenario, 
the intention is to protect the agreement from spontaneous hostile takeover attempts. 
4,479 adoption dates are used during the analysis. A sample of 232 events is excluded due to 
the insecurity of reliable CUSIP identification. The 8-digit CUSIP code is used to uniquely 
identify any issuer of shares in the United States. In 598 cases the financial data for the event 
period needed could not be found. As the reliability of the calculations depends on financial 
data, companies operated with, should be covered in the Center of Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. Additionally, events with too few estimation or event period days are not 
taken into account. This occurs in 17 and 7 cases respectively. Summing up, it can be said that 
854 security events are dropped in total. Consequently, 3,625 adoption dates are available to 
be used reliably.  






From the data sample collected a new empirical study is conducted to enrich to the 
controversial evidence about managerial entrenchment or the shareholder wealth 
maximization hypothesis. Before presenting the empirical results of the study, the 
methodology will be outlined. 
5.1 Event study methodology 
In order to identify common market reactions to poison pill adoption, this empirical research 
relies on event study methodology. As stock market data is publicly available for everyone 
and online accessible within seconds, market efficiency is assumed. Therefore, the 
information of the adoption of the poison pill is incorporated by the shareholders in a short 
while (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995).  
Event study methodology is widely used in empirical antitakeover literature. Most of the 
research presented in the literature review follows the approach in similar variations 
(Sundaramurthy et al., 1997) (Rhee & Fiss, 2014) (Schepker et al., 2016). This study adapts 
the methodology in order to make the current and more extensive data set comparable to prior 
research. In order to present the most accurate results, this empirical research bases on a daily 
event study, using daily return stock data.  
A common trend of stock market decline after the adopting event will be interpreted in favour 
of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. In this case, shareholders seem to react negatively 
on the use of antitakeover protection. They seem to be in favour of ownership changes that 
might be value creating. Inversely, a common trend of significant positive abnormal returns 
indicates evidence for the shareholder maximization hypothesis. In this matter, shareholders 
either value the long-term view, the additional bargaining power for the management or a 
combination of both factors. 




The study draws on the Eventus Software 9.0 for event studies and financial research, 
provided by Wharton Research Data Services of the Wharton School (University of 
Pennsylvania). Eventus is based on SAS algorithms. A significant advantage of Eventus is the 
connection to the Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database that allows direct 
stock prices data retrieval. 
5.1.1 Event window 
Day zero (“0”) is defined as the day of the event, which corresponds in this study to the day of 
the poison pill adoption. Days prior to the event are negative. For example, day “-5” is 
considered as five days before the adoption of the poison pill. Conversely, the terminology 
“+5” describes the date five days after the event.  
In fact, it is necessary to determine an event window. The event window is the period of time 
(measured in days) in which the abnormal returns concerning the pre-defined event are 
quantified. This study includes (several) days before and after the event date. The inclusion of 
days before the event is justified by the fact that information about the adoption event is often 
announced earlier by the media. Obviously, this effect should be included for a complete 
analysis. Additionally, the time window should also include (some) days after the event as it 
might take some time to incorporate the reaction of the market to its full extend. For instance, 
the event could occur after the market closes. Therefore, shareholders’ reaction is expressed in 
the stock prices of the following day. However, it is also important not to set the event 
window too wide as the abnormal returns get diluted and therefore the effect might not be 
highlighted adequately. In order to have control over this risk, this study elaborates various 
event windows and its results. First of all, a sudden impact of the event is measured by only 
including the event itself and the following day (0;+1). In addition, this study also controls for 
longer and shorter event windows, each centred on the event date. In detail, periods of three (-
1; +1), five (-2; +2) and seven (-3; +3) days are examined. Longer periods of pre-adoption (-




15; -4) and post-adoption (+4; +15) represent “neutral” times without the impact of the 
specific event (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
The estimation period starts 255 active trading days prior to the event and ends 46 days before 
the event takes place. In essence, the estimation period should be a regular timeframe that 
calculates the sensitivity of a firm´s beta for example. Hence, the period should be isolated 
with any influence from the event itself. 
5.1.2 Abnormal return calculations  
The help of the event study methodology makes it possible that this empirical research 
examines the resulting market reactions to the adoption of poison pills. Obviously, the events 
take place at different dates so t=0 represents the day of the realisation. In order to build a 
robust empirical model, this study follows the structural advices in “The Event Study 
Methodology since 1969” (Binder, 1998), “Event Studies in Economics and Finance” 
(MacKinley, 1997) as well as “Econometrics for Event Studies” (Kothari & Warner, 2007). 
Rit  is the return of a firm´s security i during the period t relative to the event:  
             
Therefore, the return can be seen as a composition of the expected return Kit (for example 
predicted by a model) and eit,, which is the uncertain part that is referred as “abnormal return” 
(Brown & Warner, 1985). Consequently, the abnormal return is defined as the difference 
between the observed and the predicted return: 
             
Alternatively, the abnormal return can be described as the difference between the return 
conditional of the event, subtracting the expected return without the event in place, thus 
unconditional of the event. This methodology enables to measure the direct impact of the 
event on stockholders´ wealth (Kothari & Warner, 2007). 




In order to draw general conclusions about the impact of an event, the abnormal returns have 
to be aggregated. Using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method, this paper quantifies 
the performance of the event window due to the adoption of a poison pill. The CAR starting at 
time t1 and ending at t2 is defined as the sum of the abnormal returns included (MacKinley, 
1997): 
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Adding the abnormal returns together and relating them to the event period leads to 
cumulative average abnormal return: 
      
 
 
 ∑    
 
   
 
In order to calculate the abnormal returns, a model that computes “normal” returns 
(unconditional to the event) is needed. Brown and Warner describe three variations suitable 
for excess return calculations: Mean adjusted returns, market adjusted returns and the OLS 
market model (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
5.1.2.1 Market model 
In practice, the market model is the most common model acquired for normal return 
calculations. The OLS market model is a statistical model that relates the reaction of 
shareholders to the sensitivity of a market portfolio (MacKinley, 1997). The market model is 
a one factor model facing the idiosyncratic market risk. The parameter beta (“β”) indicates if 
the stock is more or less volatile compared to the market. Beta is necessary to compute as it 
indicates the risk that cannot be minimized through diversification. Risk exposure above the 
market risk should result in more volatile stock movements. This needs to be compensated 
with a risk premium above the market return. The beta βi is computed by dividing the 




covariance of the normal return Rit and the market return Rmt by the variance of the market 
return:  
    
    (      )
    (   )
 
Incorporating the risk measure beta in our model results to the following equation:  
                   
Solving for the examined abnormal return, the equation can be restructured into (Higgins & 
Nelling, 2002): 
    (       )         
                           with     (   )                                    (   )    
  
where   ,     and   
  are defined as OLS parameters respectively. 
In order to present robust results, this study uses three different stock indexes as market 
portfolio. On the one hand, the dataset of the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is 
used as a “Equal Weighted Index“ as well as a “Value Weighted Index” (MacKinley, 1997). 
The CRSP database is one of the most numerous and complete one for historical stock market 
information of the United States. It contains data across various industries and size classes. 
Therefore, the CRSP database is chosen as a suitable benchmark as most of the adopting firms 
are smaller ones with the need of protection and as a consequence not suitable comparable to 
market indexes containing only major corporations. On the other hand, this empirical study 
also uses the S&P 500 Index as market portfolio. The S&P 500 is chosen as an appropriate 
benchmark as it represents the leading firms in the United States that cover together 75 
percentage of the entire American equity market capitalization. 
The the abnormal return (AR) can be easily quantified as the difference between the normal 
return Rit and the market return Rmt (Kothari & Warner, 2007): 




             
The market model explains variations of return due to market changes. Consequently, the 
market model offers an increased certainty for detecting event effects. 
5.1.2.2 Fama-French factor model 
The market model is a one factor model focusing entirely on the market risk. In order to 
deliver robust results, this study also tests the outcomes of calculating the normal returns via 
using the model of Fama and French. They use a three factor model including company size, 
book-to-market ratio and market risk. In their point of view, small caps and shares with a 
lower price-to-book ratio outperform the market. Hence, three variables explain stock 
anomalies more detailed and consequently detect event effects more precisely. The following 
equation leads to returns using the Fama and French methodology (Fama & French, 1993): 
               (      )                       
The excess return relative to the market portfolio can be obtained by subtracting the risk-free 
returns    from the market returns    . SMB represents the company size via measuring 
market capitalization (“Small minus Big”). According to Fama and French, small companies 
tend to outperform large firms. HML stands for the difference of companies with high book to 
market ratio and firms with a low ratio. Fama and French state that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks. The factors SMB and HML are costless available on the webpage of Kenneth 
French. The corresponding coefficients    ,    and    are sensitivities (betas) determined by 
linear regression (Fama & French, 1996) (Fama & French, 2014). 
Fama and French include additional factors in their model that offer higher explanatory 
power. This study extends the three factor model by adding an additional factor “momentum”. 
Momentum (MOM) in the context of shares describes the tendency to continue increasing 
after a period of rise and the tendency of declining after an earlier decrease. Carhart (1997) 
found this factor in his research. In essence, the existence of momentum is a market anomaly 




that financial literature struggles to explain. However, the inclusion of the momentum factor 
helps in this empirical study to explain stock price movements more accurately. According to 
Carhart´s definition, a share has a momentum factor if the previous 12 months average of 
returns is positive (Carhart, 1997). 
5.1.2.3 Statistical significance 
This empirical study also tests for the significance of the abnormal returns. Generally, there 
are two different groups of significance tests: parametric and nonparametric tests. On the one 
hand, parametric tests assume normal distribution of the companies returns. On the other 
hand, nonparametric tests do not rely on probability distribution assumptions. In order to 
ensure robust results, this study uses parametric as well as nonparametric test to deter 
statistical significance. The Patell Z-test is one of the most common used parametric tests 
(Forjan & Ness, 2003):  
    ∑      √         (   ) 
In this formula,       is defined as standardized cumulative abnormal return and   the total 
amount of companies. 
 
6 Empirical results 
This section elaborates the empirical outcome of the event study. First of all, the full data 
sample is analysed. 
6.1 Full data sample analysis 
6.1.1 Market model 
The full sample contains 4,479 adoption events from 1
st
 January 1997 to 1
st
 January 2016. 854 
events have been dropped as the dataset does not provide all the required financial 
information for the analysis. This leads to a total of 3,625 events usable. An OLS market 
model is used to test the hypothesis, in which three market indexes are used for robustness: 




CRSP Value Weighted, CRSP Equally weighted as well as the S&P 500. In all variations, 
dividends are excluded. 
Table 1 presents the results of the full sample compared to the S&P 500. It shows a detailed 
view of the event window 15 days before the event until 15 days after the event. The section 
of the table below also accumulates the abnormal returns of the different event windows 
together. The average cumulative abnormal return for a three-day event window centred on 
the adoption date (-1; 1) is 3.97% with high significance in all statistical tests. A major 
amount of 2,052 events are detected as positive abnormal returns, while only 1,571 
occurrences are negative abnormal returns respectively. Increasing the event window to five 
days (-2; 2) leads to a rise in the abnormal return to 4.54%, also significant on the 0.001 level. 
During this event window, the ratio of positive abnormal returns to negative abnormal returns 
even advances to 2,107 versus 1,516. This tendency continues for a longer period of seven 
days (-3; 3), leading to a cumulative abnormal return of 4.91%. The ratio between positive 
and negative abnormal returns is with 2,104 versus 1,520 again clearly dominated by positive 
occurrences. Moreover, we control for neutral periods where no effect should be seen. 
Therefore, a twelve days period before (-15; -4) and after (+4; +15) the event is taken into 
account. Both show a positive cumulative abnormal return of 1.16% and 1.15% respectively. 
However, a small abnormal return over a twelve days horizon should not be interpreted as 
event specific. Hence, this outcome shows that time periods significantly before and after 
follow a “normal” path while days around the event are confronted with an exogenous shock. 
To elaborate on this conclusion, one needs to focus on the detailed view. In this point of view, 
the abnormal returns and its significance are listed on a daily basis. The highest significance 
can be found at the day of the adoption of the pill (Patell Z of 24.543) and the day after the 
event (Patell Z of 39.168). Obviously, the market reaction should be the most at these days as 
shareholders adapt their portfolio to their opinion of the event. The high effect on the 
following days indicates that information is not incorporated immediately by the stockholders. 




Additionally, the results show significant abnormal returns on a 0.001 level for the period 
three days before the event. However, this outcome does not surprise as this study investigates 
the market reaction to poison pill adoption. Early significance is comprehensible as the 
announcement of the use of the poison pill is communicated earlier through media. A proof it 
is still the event which is definitely causing the positive effect can be seen in the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns per day. The day of the adoption reveals a positive abnormal 
return of 1.33% and the day afterwards 2.26% respectively. Other days in the entire event 
period (-15; 15) are mostly small and positive, but also insignificant.  
Figure 1 illustrates the empirical results visualized. The chart shows the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns on the day relative to the event (-15; +15). Additionally, the 95% confidence 
limits (from mean -1.96 standard error to mean +1.96 standard error) are denoted in the dotted 
lines as orientation. Basically, the graph shows how the abnormal returns accumulating during 
the event window. In the pre-event period, there are no strong abnormal returns recognizable. 
However, a tendency for a slightly positive market reaction can already be seen. The time 
centred on the event date then shows strong abnormal returns, indicating a highly significant 
positive market reaction due to the event. In the post-event period, significant abnormal 
returns disappear again. Again, a positive tendency is overall visible. Shareholders seem to 
value the protection of the poison pill sustainably.  
Figure 2 compares the outcomes of different abnormal return calculations. The purple line 
equals the methodology for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), elaborated more detailed in 
graph 1. In addition, figure 2 also shows the cumulative total return (CRET) as the green line 
as well as Buy-Hold abnormal return (BHAR), which represents the blue plot in the chart. As 
expected, all three abnormal return calculation methods show similar results. This offers 
evidence for the robustness of the calculations. The outcome also positions the CAR between 
the more extreme results of the CRET and BHAR calculations. As a consequence, this study 




focuses mainly on outcomes of the CAR calculation methodology as it offers more 
standardized and less extreme values. Generally, the CAR methodology is the one most 
widely used in academic literature and the business world.  
In order to present robust outcomes, this study conducts the analysis for the same sample with 
the CRSP Equally Weighted Index as benchmark as well. The results are presented in table 2. 
As expected, the outcome is very similar to the prior ones. Abnormal returns are now 1.35% 
for the event date and 2.25% for the day afterwards. The neutral time periods of twelve days 
before and after the event show the biggest difference. The pre-adoption period (-4; -15) has a 
cumulative abnormal return of 1.05%. Similarly, the post-adoption period (+4; 15) displays a 
positive abnormal return of 0.96%. Therefore, the equally weighted market model indicates 
more accurately the neutrality controlled for the period before and after the event.  
Finally, the CRSP Value Weighted Index is used as the last variation of the market model. 
Table 3 elaborates the results with the value weighted benchmark option. Again, the outcome 
is similar to the previous two variations of the market model. In this version, the abnormal 
return at the event date is 1.33% and 2.25% for the following date respectively.  
Summing up, all three variations of the market model lead to relatively similar results. 
Consequently, the results can be interpreted as robust. All three models indicate positive 
abnormal returns, especially centred on the adoption date of the poison pill. Taking all 
outcomes into consideration, the evidence of the market model clearly argues in favour of the 
wealth maximization hypothesis as the abnormal returns are thorough positive and statistically 
significant. 
6.1.2 Fama-French model 
Fama and French include additional factors in their model. This study also incorporates the 
analysis of the momentum factor in line with Carhart (1997). These factor models are 
supposed to have a higher explanatory power.  




Table 4 shows the results of the factor model. The comparison to the market model is drawn 
with the Value Weighted Index as benchmark. This version reflects reality more reasonable as 
bigger firms also have more impact in economic life than small ones. First of all, the day of 
the event (“0”) has a highly significant, positive abnormal return of 1.29%. Adding the 2.21% 
abnormal return of the following day, leads to a cumulative abnormal return of 3.50%, centred 
on the event date (0; 1). A longer event window of three days (-1; +1) reveals a cumulative 
abnormal return of 3.86%. The market model indicates a relatively higher abnormal return of 
3.97% for the same period. This tendency can also be steadily recognized in longer event 
windows of five (-2; +2) and seven days (-3; +3). The longest event window (-3; +3) states a 
CAR of 4.66%. In this scenario, the market model expresses a 5.2% higher value compared to 
the factor model.  
In order to present robust results, the same analysis is also conducted for the Equally 
Weighted Index. In essence, the outcome provides similar results to the prior analysis. The 
main period centred on the adoption date states a cumulative abnormal return of 3.52% for the 
Fama-French version versus 3.59% for the market model respectively. The similar result for 
different models provides evidence in favour of the robustness of the calculations.  
Summing up, the market model shows higher, positive abnormal returns than the factor 
model. This is in line with previous expectations as factor models have additional explanatory 
power. Hence, the factor model can identify certain empirical proven market anomalies while 
the market model recognizes them as additional abnormal returns.  
6.2 Further analysis 
In general, this empirical research finds highly significant positive abnormal returns for 
various event windows. Thus, the full sample analysis clearly argues in favour of the 
shareholders wealth maximization hypothesis. In order to provide further specific statements, 
the paper also controls for various sub-samples. 




6.2.1 Sub-period analysis 
In order to elaborate differences concerning time periods, the sample is divided in smaller 
time periods. 710 poison pill adoptions affect the time between 2010 and 2015. In order to 
guarantee reliable results, an amount of 170 events are dropped.  
In essence, the results of the latest sub period are even more clear and straightforward than the 
full sample analysis. The day of the event shows a highly significant (Patell Z of 13.940) 
positive abnormal return of 1.57%. The abnormal return of the following day amounts 2.03%. 
(Patell Z of 15.982). Interestingly, the second day after the event (+1) does already indicate 
insignificant outcomes. In addition, the day before the event (-1) shows a significant abnormal 
return on the 0.1 level. Hence, there is a clear positive market reaction to poison pill adoption. 
The information seems to be incorporated quicker into the share price compared to the full 
sample. An explanation could be the technological advantage of the recent period. 
Additionally, the legal clarification process and acceptance of poison pill usage continues to 
rise during the years.  
955 poison pill adoptions match the time from 2005 to 2009. In this period, the abnormal 
return of the event date is only 0.36%. Generally, the cumulative abnormal returns of different 
event windows are lower compared to the full sample results. A logic explanation for this 
outcome is the fact that the sample size contains the years of the financial crisis between 2007 
and 2009. Many economists see this period as the worst financial breakdown since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. 
The abnormal returns of the period from 2000 to 2004 are 1.88% on the day of adoption and 
2.58% the following day and therefore significantly higher compared to the previous period. 
Again, the tendency for less significance around the centred event than in the entire sample 
stays accurate.  




Finally, a sub-period of a prior decade is tested. In essence, the abnormal results are 
significantly lower than previous sub-periods that do not have a financial crisis in place. 
While the Moran v. Household ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court already validated the 
usage of poison pills in 1985, most of the legal rulings took place during the 90s. The 1995 
Delaware rulings are often referred as an essential decision in poison pill clarification. 
Generally, the 90s still seem to be a developing time frame for poison pill usage (Heron & 
Lie, 2015). Thus, the additional uncertainty relative to later sub periods might be an 
explanation for the lower abnormal returns.  
Summing up, all the sub periods controlled for show highly significant abnormal returns 
centred on the date of the adoption. Consequently, this empirical research strongly argues in 
favour of the shareholders´ wealth maximization hypothesis.  
6.2.2 Takeover activity 
This sub sample analysis focuses on a following takeover after the adoption is in place. On the 
one hand, this section controls for the difference of routine adoptions and events caused by 
takeover interests. The majority of the events (68.41%) are routine measures. Hence, the 
results of the routine measures are compared to the other events (31.59%). On the other hand, 
this study controls for differences of companies that adopted pills and have been merged or 
acquired and companies that still exist independently. In this manner, the results indicate 
whether shareholders value a direct takeover threat differently. 
First of all, table 5 shows the results for a sample solely existing of routine measure 
adoptions. An amount of 2,555 events is reliably usable for this purpose. Surprisingly, the 
outcome differs significantly from the prior results so far. The day of the event (“0”) shows a 
small, positive abnormal return of 0.12%, but only significant on the 0.1 level. In a more 
specific view, a share of 1.359 adoption dates show negative abnormal returns, while only 
1,195 events display positive abnormal returns. The following day of the event (“+1”) shows 




a highly significant (Patell Z of 7.968) abnormal return of 0.59%. However, the detailed 
illustration balances within positive and negative returns really similar with 1,289 to 1,265 
events. Summing up, the findings of the routine measure sample are not as clear and highly 
significant. In order to clarify the drivers of the entire, more significant sample, table 6 shows 
the results of non-routine measure adoption cases. The 56 events that have no reason of 
adoption stated are dropped in order to guarantee robust results. In essence, the non-routine 
measure sample consists of 20 categories that are mostly varieties of takeover threats. The 
results of the non-routine measure sample indicate strong und highly significant abnormal 
returns in case of a foreseeable takeover threat. The event date shows a highly significant 
(Patell Z of 43.223) abnormal return of 4.36% with a ratio of 613 positive abnormal returns to 
407 negative ones. The abnormal return on the following day is even bigger (6.48%) and 
more significant (Patell Z of 60.962). Again, the results also show a first reaction of 1.24% on 
the day before. This can be explained by the fact that the event might have been announced 
earlier in the media and therefore shareholders already expect the decision. 
As the non-routine measure sample consists of 20 categories of takeover activity, it is of great 
interest to understand the drivers of this sample. Therefore, this study controls for the specific 
classes of poison pill usage. Surprisingly, the highest incidents occur for pill adoptions that 
were placed as a response to a “friendly deal”. These events show extraordinary abnormal 
returns at the day of the event (6.45%) and the following day (10.26%). “Hostile offers” 
reveal abnormal returns of 4.97% and 0.41% respectively. Next in line are “unsolicited bids” 
with 3.82% and 2.12%. This outcome leads to the important insight that shareholder do not 
automatically favour the isolation of the corporate control market through the usage of poison 
pills. They seem to highly appreciate friendly transactions and therefore value the protection 
of the friendly deal against potential hostile takeover attempts. In general, shareholders do 
welcome poison pill adoption as a response to an unwelcome offer. Contrary, categories as 
“sudden stake accumulation”, “shareholder proposal” or “friendly stakeholder” do not show a 




common market reaction. Abnormal returns are either positive or negative but remain 
statistically insignificant. 
Summing up, most of the positive abnormal returns of the full sample result from non-routine 
measure adoptions. Without doubt, these routine adoptions are most likely expected and it is 
for these grounds that shareholders do not suddenly adapt the stock price expectation. The 
effect might be small, but still significant and positive. However, the results show that 
shareholder react very positively to antitakeover devices in case of an unwelcomed takeover 
threat. Consequently, the distinction of poison pills with different adoption purposes is 
urgently necessary to justify the market reaction. Early literature as Ryngaert (1988) or 
Malesta and Walkling (1988) do not incorporate that analysis. 
In order to present robust results, this empirical research also conducts a similar analysis. 
During the data collection via Bloomberg, the information if the company still exists as it has 
been when adopting the pill was retrieved. In case of an acquisition, this information was 
noted. This sample is supposed to have a takeover threat before the takeover occurs. Firms 
that have been “delisted” or are defined as “unlisted” are excluded from the sample. 
In essence, the findings of this robustness test are in line with the previous results. The results 
outperform the full sample in every event window that has been controlled for. The event 
period centred on the event date (0; +1) shows significance on the 0.01 level and a cumulative 
abnormal return of 5.98%. Again, the outcome differs significantly for the firms that have not 
been taken over and consequently are not interpreted of having a feasible takeover threat. This 
conclusion is in line with Schepker et al. (2016) who has come to similar results. The day of 
the event has a positive abnormal return of 0.35%. However, only 776 events are defined 
positive, while 857 are negative. Hence, firms that have not been acquired after adopting the 
poison pill do not give strong evidence for the shareholder maximization hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, they still give a tendency for being positive. 




All in all, both empirical analyses show the importance of dividing poison pill adoptions by 
its usage. In the case of an unwelcomed takeover threat, shareholders appreciate the adoption 
of the pill significantly. Routine measures do not motivate shareholders for a sudden stock 
price adaption. 
6.2.3 Industry analysis 
In order to ascertain a deeper analysis of the positive abnormal returns, this study also 
controls for industry characteristics. Therefore the sample of 4,479 adoption dates is divided 
into the corresponding industries that the firms are mainly operating in. Expectably, the 
results vary across industries. For banks, a majority of 44 adoptions are negative at the day of 
the event while only 28 occurrences show positive results. However, the results remain 
insignificant. Contrary to this example, the result for the “software” industry shows highly 
significant abnormal returns on the day of the event (2.73%) and the following day (4.13%). 
A similar strong reaction is detected for the pharmaceutical industry with 1.68% and 5.59% 
respectively.  
A possible explanation could be the distinction between industries with high and low takeover 
activity. The software and the pharmaceutical industry are known to be takeover intense. 
Their success relies on the successful implementation of certain products as drugs or 
programs. Merger and acquisitions are relatively rare in the banking sector. However, this 
argumentation should be interpreted with caution as the industry samples differ in their usage 
of poison pills. Interestingly, the banking sample has a remarkably high share of routine 
adoptions (84.88%), while the industries of software (56.94%) and pharmaceuticals (68.99%) 
have significantly lower stakes. This finding supports the earlier insight that the reason of 
poison pill adoption needs to be incorporated when measuring the market reaction. 




6.2.4 Termination of poison pills 
As a further analysis, it is also interesting to control for a market reaction to the termination of 
the antitakeover device. As the full data sample uses recent adoption dates and since a lot of 
events have not reached the termination date yet, only a limited amount of 1,336 poison pill 
expiration dates can be reliably used. Table 7 displays the results of the empirical analysis. 
Most of the event windows that have been controlled for do not show statistical significant 
abnormal returns. The event window centred on the expiration date (0; +1) displays a small 
abnormal return of 0.41%. However, the level of significance (0.05) is relatively low in 
relation to previous results. As a result, there is no real evidence supporting a market reaction 
at the expiration date of the pill. A possible explanation is that the date of the termination is 
declared in advance so shareholders do not need to adjust their stock price expectation 
suddenly. Additionally, at the date of the expiration there might already be a new adoption in 
place or in the process of planning. This is especially the case for routine measure adoptions.  
 
7 Interpretation of results 
Poison pills are controversial devices. However, this empirical research clearly offers 
evidence in favour of the shareholders wealth maximization hypothesis. Shareholder right 
plans have a positive impact on shareholders´ value as the market model shows strong 
abnormal returns. This finding is robust for the S&P 500, the CRSP Weighted Index as well as 
the CRSP Equally Weighted Index as market benchmark options. In addition, the Fama-
French-momentum factor model shows that the results are robust and not model biased. 
Controlling for various sub-periods leads to the insight that economic conditions do influence 
stock price reaction. However, the positive market reaction to poison pill adoptions stays 
robust for every time frame. Further analysis indicates a weak market reaction to the routine 
measure adoption cases while an unwelcomed takeover threat leads to enormously significant 
abnormal returns. Remarkably, this is also the case if the company just completed a friendly 




deal. Shareholders do not value the isolation from the external forces of the corporate control 
market but seem to oppose hostile takeover attempts. This result is in line with another current 
paper of Schepker et al. (2016). In this scenario, shareholders seem to value the protection 
trough this antitakeover device positively. The positive outcome of poison pill adoption 
coincides with prior findings of Comment and Schwert (1995), Fuchs (2001) and Hannes 
(2002) who find protected companies with an increase bargaining position and higher 
takeover premiums in case of an takeover. In addition to that, Danielson and Karpoff (2002) 
state a rise in performance for firms with a shareholder rights plan in place. Moreover, there is 
no strong positive market reaction to poison pill termination. 
All in all, early literature like Ryngaert (1988) or Malesta and Walkling (1988) find negative 
market reactions to poison pill adoption. In addition to this empirical study, more current 
papers show a tendency for a positive market reaction as Lipton (2015) or Heron and Lie 
(2015) for instance. Taking all evidence together, this paper finds positive abnormal market 
returns for poison pill adoption and therefore clearly argues in favour of the shareholder 
maximization hypothesis. Poison pills have a positive effect on shareholder value. 
 
8 Limitations and future research directions 
Besides, it is necessary to keep the limitations of this study in mind. First of all, this study 
focuses on poison pill adoption dates. In essence, there might be already an earlier effect due 
to the media announcement in advance is possible. In this case, the entire effect could not be 
seen solely at the date of the adoption. In order to minimize this effect, this study controls for 
a variety of event windows. Furthermore, similar studies that have been published in 
prestigious journals as the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis for instance also do 
use adoption dates for the corresponding analysis (Goh & Caton, 2008). As already 




mentioned, the market reaction to poison pill expiration might be blurred through renewed 
routine measures.  
Generally, this empirical study could be the base of further research. After the invention of the 
poison pill by Martin Lipton in 1982, a vast amount of poison pill research was published in 
the 80s and 90s. Most of the analysis at that period were more basic and support the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis. In the current century, the research conducted in this 
area declined. Although the research to poison pills remains controversial, there seems to be a 
tendency now in favour of the shareholder wealth maximisation hypothesis. Further research 
on the base of this study might finally clarify how shareholders value poison pills.  
 
9 Conclusion 
When Martin Lipton invented the poison pill in 1982 and since then, they have been viewed 
as controversial devices (Sunder, 2014). Poison pill intervene in an ordinary corporate control 
market and can be implemented without shareholder approval in the United States (Johnson & 
Meade, 2011). Early literature as Malatesta and Walkling (1988) or Ryngaert (1988) mostly 
define shareholder right plans as management entrenching provisions. Recent research as 
Schepker et al. (2016) or Heron and Lie (2015) tend to find a positive market reaction to 
poison pill adoption. This conclusion is in line with the empirical findings of this paper. The 
analysis shows highly significant abnormal returns centred on the date of the pill adoption. 
Diverse model variations confirm the robustness of this outcome. Further sub-sample analysis 
indicates that poison pill adoption with an unwelcomed takeover threat drive the positive 
results in the sample. This does not mean that shareholders value the isolation of the firm in 
the market of corporate control automatically. In fact, the protection of “friendly deals” is 
appreciated the most. Contrary, routine poison pills do not show clear positive abnormal 
returns at the date of the pill adoption. Summing up, shareholders react positively to poison 




pill adoption, especially if they expect a hostile takeover attempt. Shareholders seem to value 
the protecting effect that provides management a superior bargaining position. This position 
allows management to negotiate to the maximal possible bid premium (Datta & Iskandar-
Datta, 1996). 
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Table 1: Market Model Abnormal Returns, S&P 500 Table 1: Market Model Abnormal Returns, S&P 500 




Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Return: Mean & 95% Confidence Limits 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean Cumulative Return by Day Relative to Event 
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Table 3: Market Model Abnormal Returns, Value Weighted Index 





Table 4: Fama-French-Momentum Model Abnormal Returns, Value Weighte  Index 







Table 5: Routine measure Market Model Abnormal Returns, S&P 500 





   
  
Table 6: Non-routine measure Market Model Abnormal Returns, S&P 500 






Table 7: Termination Dates Market Model Abnormal Returns, S&P 500 
